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Indian Philosophy »  Persons »  Sense spheres (āyatana) »  Argument from the untenability of possession of action »  Neither (the instrument) the visual faculty, nor (the action) non-visual faculty see, nor does (the agent) the seer »  That which is seen cannot see either because seeing is without a nature »  From that which sees there is no that which is seen, because the different natures of things cannot be seen

From that which sees there is no that which is seen, because the different natures of things cannot be seen

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Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā of Nāgārjuna

Sthiramati's Commentary on Nāgārjuna's Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā, section T30, no. 1567, 143a1


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