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རྩོད་པ་བཟློག་པའི་ཚིག་ལེའུར་བྱས་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ། རྩོད་པ་བཟློག་པའི་འགྲེལ་པ།






If it is true that nothing has substance, then the assertion that nothing has substance is ineffective in refuting the claim that things have substance, because the assertion itself lacks substance.

1
.. namo buddhāya .

sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ sarvatra na vidyate svabhāvaś cet .
tvadvacanam asvabhāvaṃ na nivartayitum svabhāvam alaṃ .. 1 ..

yadi sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ hetau pratyayeṣu ca hetupratyayasāmagrāñ ca pṛthak ca yatra sarvatra svabhāvo na vidyata iti kṛtvā śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti . na hi bīje hetubhūte 'ṅkuro sti . na pṛthivyaptejovāyvādinām ekekasmin pratyayasaṃjñite . na pratyayeṣu samagreṣu na hetupratyayeṣu samagreṣu na hetupratyayasāmagrāṃ na hetupratyayavinirmuktaḥ pṛthag eva vā . yasmād atra svabhāvo nāsti tasmān niḥsvabhāvo 'ṅkuraḥ . yasmān niḥsvabhāvaḥ tasmāt śūnyaḥ . yathā cāyam aṅkuro niḥsvabhāvo niḥsvabhāvāc ca śūnyaḥ tathā sarvabhāvā niḥsvabhāvatvāc chūnya iti .

atra vayaṃ brūmaḥ . yady evaṃ tavāpi vacanaṃ yady etac chūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tad api śūnyaṃ . kiṃ kāraṇaṃ tad api hetau nāsti . mahābhūteṣu saṃprayukteṣu viprayukteṣu vā pratyayeṣu nāsti . uraḥkaṇthoṣṭhajihvādantamūlatālunāsikāmūrdhaprabhṛtiṣu yan naivobhayasāmagryām asti . hetupratyayasamagrīvinirmuktaṃ pṛthag eva vā nāsti . yasmād atra sarvatra nāsti . tasmān niḥsvabhāvaṃ . yasmān niḥsvabhāvaṃ . tasmāc chūnyaṃ . tasmād anena sarvabhāvasvabhāvavyāvartanam aśakyaṃ kartuṃ . kiṃ kāraṇaṃ . na hy asadagninā dagdhaṃ . nāpy asatā śāstreṇa śakyaṃ chettuṃ . nāsatībhir adbhiḥ śakyaṃ kledayitum evam asattā vacanena śakyaḥ sarvabhāvasvabhāvapratiṣedhaḥ kartuṃ na śakyaḥ sarvabhāvasvabhāvo nivartayituṃ . tatra yad uktaṃ sarvabhāvasvabhāvaḥ pratiṣidhaḥ sarvatra bhāvasvabhāvo vinivartata iti . tan na ..

If the assertion that nothing has substance has substance itself, then it refutes itself.

2
atha sasvabhāvam etad vākyaṃ pūrvā hata pratijñā te .
vaiṣamikatvaṃ tasmin viśeṣahetuś ca vaktavyaḥ .. 2 ..

athāpi manyase mā bhūd eṣa doṣa iti sasvabhāvam etad vākyaṃ . sasvabhāvatvāc cāśūnyaṃ . tasmād anena sarvabhāvasvabhāvaḥ pratiṣiddhaḥ sarvabhāvasvabhāvo vinivarta iti ..

atra brūmaḥ . yā hi te pratijñā śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti . hatā śā .. kiñcānyat sarvabhāvāntargatañ ca tadvacanam . kasmāt sarvabhāveṣu tvadvacanam aśūnyaṃ yenāśūnyatvāt sarvabhāvasvabhāvaḥ pratiṣiddhaḥ .. evaṃ ṣaṭkoṭiko vādaḥ prasaktaḥ . sa punaḥ katham iti .

hanta cet punaḥ śūnyāḥ sarvahhāvās tena tvadvacanaṃ śūnyam sarvabhāvāntargatatvāt tvadvacanasya . tena śūnyena pratiṣedhānupapattiḥ . tatra yaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ śūnyāḥ sarvabhāva iti anupapannaḥ . 1 . upapannaś cet punaḥ śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti pratiṣedhas tena tvadvacanaśūnyatvād anena pratiṣedho anupapannaḥ . 2 . atha śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvās tvadvacanañ cāśūnyaḥ yena pratiṣedhas tena tvadvacanaṃ sarvatrāsaṃgṛhītaṃ . tatra dṛṣṭāntavirodhaḥ . 3 . sarvatra cet punaḥ gṛhītaṃ tvadvacanaṃ sarvabhāvāś ca śūnyāḥ . tena tad api śūnyaṃ śūnyatvād anena nāsti pratiṣedhaḥ . 4 . atha śūnyam asti vānena pratiṣedhaḥ śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tena śūnyāpi sarvabhāvāḥ kāryakriyāsamarthā samarthabhaveyuḥ . na caitad iṣṭaṃ . 5 . atha śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ na ca kāryaṃ kriyāsamarthaṃ bhavaṃti mā bhūt dṛṣṭāntavirodha iti kṛtvā śūnyena tvadvacanena sarvabhāvāsvabhāvo pratiṣedho nopapanna iti . 6 .

kiñcānyat . evaṃ tadastitvāt vaiṣamikatvaprasaṅgaḥ . kiñcit śūnyaṃ kiñcid aśūnyam iti . tasmiṃś ca vaisamikatve viśeṣahetur vaktavyaḥ . yena hi viśeṣahetunā kiñcit śūnyaṃ kiñcid aśūnyaṃ syāt . sa ca nopadiṣṭo hetuḥ . tatra yad uktaṃ śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tan na ..

kiñcānyat

In the case of 'do not make a sound' a future sound is prevented by an existing one, but the assertion of emptiness cannot be efficacious in negating the substance of all things, because this assertion itself must be non-existent.

3
mā śabdavad ity etat syāt te buddhir na caitad upapannaṃ .
śabdenātra satā bhaviṣyato vāraṇaṃ tasya .. 3 ..

syāt te buddhiḥ yathā nāma kaścit brūyāt mā śabdaṃ kārṣīr mā śabdaṃ kārṣīr iti . tena ca śabdena vyāvartanaṃ kriyate . evam eva śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti . śūnyena vacanena sarvatā sarvabhāvasvabhāvavyavartanaṃ kriyata iti .

atra vayaṃ brūmaḥ . etad apy anupapannaṃ kiṃ kāraṇaṃ . sattā hy atra śabdena hy atra bhaviṣyataḥ śabdasya pratiṣedhaḥ kriyate . na punar iha bhavataḥ satā vacanena sarvabhāvasvabhāvapratiṣedhaḥ kriyate . tava hi matena vacanam apy asat . sarvabhāvasvabhāvo 'py asat . tasmād ayaṃ mā śabdavad iti viṣayopanyāso 'sann iti ..

kiñca

The thesis of emptiness fails as negation of negation

4
pratipratiṣedhyo 'py evam iti mataṃ bhavet tad asad eva .
evaṃ tava pratijña lakṣaṇato dūṣyate na mama .. 4 ..

syāt te buddhiḥ pratiṣedhaḥ pratiṣedhyo 'py anenaiva kalpenānupapannaḥ . tatra yad bhavāna sarvabhāvasvabhāvapratiṣedhaśūcanaṃ pratiṣedhayati . tad anupapannam iti .

atra vayaṃ brūmaḥ . etad aśabdena sad eva . kasmāt tava ca hi pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptam etan na mama bhavān iha bravīti . śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti nāhaṃ . tasmāt tvatpratijñān na(?)payāmi . pūrvakaḥ pakṣo na mama . tatra yad uktaṃ pratiṣedhaḥ pratiṣedhyo 'py evaṃ matam iti . upapannam iti .. tan na .

kiñcānyat .

The conflict between perception and thesis of emptiness

5
pratyakṣeṇa hi tāvad yady upalabhya vinivartayasi bhāvān .
tan nāsti pratyakṣaṃ bhāvā yenopalabhyante .. 5 ..

yadi pratyakṣataḥ sarvabhāvān upalabhya bhavāna nivartayati śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti . tad anupapannaṃ . kasmāt pratyakṣam api hi pramāṇaṃ svabhāvāntargatatvāt śūnyaṃ . yo 'pi sarvabhāvān upalabhate so 'pi śūnyas tasmāt pratyakṣeṇa pramāṇena nopalambhabhāvo anupalabdhasya ca pratiṣedhānupapattiḥ śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti . tad anupapannaṃ

syāt te buddhiḥ . anumānenāgamenopamānena vā sarvabhāvān upalabhya sarvabhāvavyāvartanaṃ kriyata iti ..

atra brūmaḥ .

And for things which are not apprehended the thesis of emptiness fails to be established

6
anumānaṃ pratyuktaṃ pratyakṣeṇāgamopamāne ca .
anumānāgamasādhyā ye 'rthā dṛṣṭāntasādhyāś ca .. 6 ..

anumānam apy upamānāgamāś ca pratyakṣeṇa pramāṇena pratyuktāḥ . yathā hi pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇaṃ śūnyaṃ sarvabhāvānāṃ śūnyatvāt . evam anumānamopamāgamāpi śūnyāḥ . sarvabhāvānāṃ śūnyatvāt . ye 'py anumānasādhyārthā āgamasādhyā upamānasādhyāś ca . te 'pi śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvānāṃ śūnyatvāt anumānopamānāgamaiś ca yo 'pi bhāvān upalabhate so 'pi śūnyaḥ tasmāt bbāvānām upalambhābhāvo 'nupalabdhānāñ ca svabhāvapratiṣedhānupapattiḥ . tatra yad uktaṃ śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti . tan na ..

kiñcānyat .

The phenomena which make the Buddhist path a reliable means of attaining enlightenment have their qualities intrinsically.

7
kuśalānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ dharmāvasthavidaś ca manyante .
kuśalaṃ janasvabhāvaṃ śeṣeṣv apy eṣa viniyogaḥ .. 7 ..

iha dharmāvasthāvido manyante kuśalānāṃ dharmāṇām ekonaviṃśaṃ śataṃ . tadyathā ekadeśo vijñānasya vedanāyāḥ . saṃjñāyāś cetanāyāḥ . sparśasya manasikārasya chandasyādhimokṣasya vīryasya smṛteḥ samādheḥ prajñāyā upekṣāyāḥ prayogasya saṃprayogasya prāpto 'dhyāśayasya prativirateḥ vyavasāyā autsukyasya . unmūrḍhe utsāhasya avyārtyasya vasitāyāḥ pratipatter avipratīsārasya dhṛter adhyavasāyasya . anaukṣekasya ananumūḍhyanutsārasya . prāpaṇāyāḥ praṇidheḥ madasya viṣayānāṃ viprayogasya . aniryāṇikatāyā utsādasya . sthiter anityatāyāḥ samarthāgatasya jarāyāḥ paridrāsyatārateḥ . vitarkānāṃ prīteḥ pramādasya aprasrabdheḥ . vyavahāratāyāḥ . prekṣupratikūlasya pradakṣiṇagrāhasya vaiśāradyagauravasya citrīkārasya bhakter abhakteḥ suśrūṣāyāḥ sādarasyānādarasya prasrabdheḥ . hāsasya vācaḥ viṣpandanāyāḥ siddhasyāprasādasya aprasrabdheḥ vyavahāratāyaḥ . dākṣyasya sauratyasya vipratisārasya śokasya . upāyāsāyās vītasya . apradakṣiṇagrāhasya samepasya saṃvarāṇāṃ pariśuddher adhyāśayasya rūpasyeti . śraddhā hrīr ārjavam avañcanaṃ . upasama acāmala saprasādamārdavaṃ pratisaṃkhyānaṃ nirveda 'paridāhaḥ . amada alobha adoṣa amoha asarvat apratiniḥsargaḥ vibhava apatrayā apariśucchadanaṃ mānanaṃ kāruṇyaṃ maitrī adīnatādaritam ari(d)ha 'nupanāhaḥ alī cetaso paryādānaṃ kṣāntiḥ . vyavasadu āsaurakyam iti bhāgānvayaṃ . puṇyaṃ . asaṃjñisamāpattiḥ . nairyāṇikatāsarvajñatāsaṃskṛtā dharmā ity ekonaviṃśaṃ śataṃ kuśalānāṃ kuśalaḥ svabhāvaḥ ..

tathākuśalānām akuśalaḥ svabhāvaḥ . nivṛttāvyākṛtaḥ . prakṛtāvyākṛtānāṃ prakṛtāvyākṛtaḥ . kāmoktānāṃ kāmoktaḥ . rūpoktānāṃ rūpoktaḥ . ārūpyoktānām ārūpyoktaḥ . anāśravāṇām anāśravaḥ . duḥkhoktānāṃ duḥkhoktaḥ . samudayoktānāṃ samudayoktaḥ . nirodhoktānāṃ nirodhoktaḥ . mārgoktānāṃ mārgoktaḥ . bhāvanāprahātavyānāṃ bhāvanāprahātavyaḥ . aprahātavyānām aprahātavyaḥ . prahātavyānāṃ prahātavyaḥ . yasmād evam anekaprakāro dharmasvabhāvo dṛṣṭaḥ . tasmād iha yad uktaṃ . niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ niḥsvabhāvatvāt śūnyā iti tan na .

kiñcānyat .

The phenomena which make the Buddhist path a reliable means of attaining enlightenment have their qualities intrinsically.

8
nairyāṇikasvabhāvo dharmo nairyāṇikāś ca ye teṣāṃ .
dharmāvasthoktānām eva ca nairyāṇikādīnāṃ .. 8 ..

iha ca dharmo 'vasthoktānāṃ nairyāṇikānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ niryāṇikaḥ svabhāvaḥ . anairyāṇikānām anairyāṇikaḥ . bodhyaṅgikānāṃ bodhyaṅgikaḥ . abodhyaṅgikānām abodhyaṅgikaḥ . bodhipākṣikāṇāṃ bodhipākṣikaḥ . abodhipākṣikāṇām abodhipākṣikaḥ . evaṃ śeṣāṇāṃ tad yasmād evam anekaprakāro dharmāṇāṃ svabhāvo dṛṣṭaḥ . yasmād yad uktaṃ niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ . niḥsvabhāvatvāt śūnyā iti na ..

kiñcānyat .

 

As, according to a realist semantics, there is no name without a referent, there must be a referent for the word 'substance', and the statement 'all things are without substance' is therefore untenable.

9
yadi ca na bhavet svabhāvo dharmāṇāṃ niḥsvabhāva ity evaṃ .
nāmāpi bhavet naivaṃ nāmāpi nirvastukan nāsti .. 9 ..

yadi ca dharmāṇāṃ svabhāvo bhāvānāṃ svabhāvānāṃ sadbhāvāc cāśūnyāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ . tatra yad uktaṃ niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā niḥsvabhāvatvāt śūnyā iti tan na ..

kiñcānyat .

10
atha vidyate svabhāvaḥ sa ca dharmāṇāṃ na vidyate tasmāt .
dharmair vinā svabhāvaḥ sa yasyāsti tad yuktam upadeṣṭum .. 10 ..

atha manyase mā bhūd avastukaṃ nāmeti kṛtvāsti svabhāvaḥ . sa punar dharmāṇāṃ na saṃbhavati . evaṃ dharmaśūnyatā ca niḥsvabhāvatvād dharmāṇāṃ siddhā bhaviṣyati . na ca nirvastukan nāmeti .

atra vayaṃ brūmaḥ . evaṃ kasyedānīṃ sa svabhāvo dharmavinirmuktasyārthasya tad yuktam upadeṣṭum arthaḥ . sa ca nopadiṣṭas tasmād yā kalpanā 'sti svabhāvo na punar dharmāṇām iti sā hīnā ..

kiñcānyat .

The statement 'there is no substance' achieves the negation of an existent substance, not of a non-existent substance, in the same way as for the statement 'there is no pot in the house' to be meaningful, there must be a pot somewhere.

11
sata eva pratiṣedho nāsti ghaṭo geha ity ayaṃ yasmāt .
dṛṣṭaḥ pratiṣedho yaṃ sataḥ svabhāvasya te tasmāt .. 11 ..

iha ca sato 'rthasya pratiṣedhaḥ kriyate nāmataḥ . tadyathā nāsti ghaṭo geha iti . sato ghaṭasya pratiṣedhaḥ kriyate . nāsataḥ . evam eva nāsti svabhāvo dharmāṇām iti . sataḥ svabhāvasya pratiṣedhaḥ prāpnoti nāmataḥ . tatra yad uktaṃ . niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ niḥsvabhāvatvāt śūnyā iti tan na .. pratiṣedhasaṃbhavād eva hi sarvabhāvasvabhāvasvabhāvo 'pratiṣiddhaḥ ..

The negation of a non-existent is established without words; if substance is non-existent, what use is its negation by the statement 'all things are insubstantial'?

12
atha nāsti sa svabhāvaḥ kin na pratiṣidhyate tvayānena .
vacanena rte vacanāt pratiṣedhaḥ sidhyate hy asataḥ .. 12 ..

nāsty eva svabhāvā ity anena vacanena niḥsvabhāvā bhāvā iti kiṃ bhavatā pratiṣidhyate . asato hi vacanād vinā siddhaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ . tadyathāgneḥ śaityasya . ayaṃ sthairyasya .

kiñcānyat .

The thesis of emptiness presented through the water mirage analogy

13
bālānām iva mithyā mṛgatṛṣṇāyāṃ yathājalagrāhaḥ .
evaṃ mithyāḥ grāhaḥ syāt te pratiṣidhyate hy asataḥ .. 13 ..

syāt te buddhiḥ yathā bālānāṃ mṛgatṛṣṇāyāṃ mithyājalam iti grāho bhavati . nanu nirjalā sā mṛgatṛṣṇeti tatra paṇḍitajātīyena puruṣeṇocyate . tasya mithyāgrāhasya vinivartanārtham evan niḥsvabhāveṣu yaḥ svabhāvo grāhaḥ satvānāṃ tasya vyāvartanārthan niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā ity ucyata iti ..

atra brūmaḥ .

For the water mirage analogy to be applicable, the following things must exist: the perception, the perceived, the perceiver, the negation, the negated and the negator.

14
nanv evaṃ saty asti grāho grāhyañ ca tadgrahītā ca .
pratiṣedhaḥ pratiṣedhyaṃ pratiṣedhā ceti ṣaṭkaṃ tat .. 14 ..

yady evaṃ nanv evaṃ saty asti tāvat satvānāṃ mithyāgrāhaḥ . asti grāhyaṃ santi satvā grahītāraḥ . asti pratiṣedhaḥ tasyāpi mithyāgrāhasyāsti pratiṣedhyaṃ yad idaṃ mithyāgrāhyaṃ nāma . santi pratiṣedhāro yuṣmadādayo 'sya mithyāgrāhasyeti siddhaṃ ṣaṭkam . ṣaṭkasyāsya prasiddhatvāt . yad uktaṃ śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tan na ..

As negation needs something to operate on, if there is no perception, no perceived, and no perceiver, then there is no negation, no object of negation, and no negator.

15
atha naivāsti grāho na ca grāhyaṃ na ca grahītāraḥ .
pratiṣedhyaḥ pratiṣedhyaṃ pratiṣedhāro 'py ata na santi ..15 ..

atha mā bhūd eṣa doṣa iti kṛtvā naiva grāho 'sti naiva grāhyaṃ na ca grahītāra iti . evaṃ sati yo 'sau grāhasya pratiṣedhaḥ niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā iti . so 'pi nāsti pratiṣedhyam api nāsti pratiṣedhāro 'pi na santi .

While there is no negation, no object of negation, and no negator, all things are unnegated and the substance of all things exists.

16
pratiṣedhaḥ pratiṣedhyaṃ pratiṣedhāraś ca yady uta na santi .
siddhā hi sarvabhāvā yeṣām evaṃ svabhāvaś ca .. 16 ..

yadi ca na pratiṣedho na pratiṣedhyaṃ na pratiṣeddhāraḥ santy apratisiddhāḥ sarvabhāvā asti ca sarvabhāvānāṃ svabhāvaḥ ..

kiñcānyat .

If reason is insubstantial, how is it going to function as a support for the thesis of emptiness?

17
hetoḥ svato na siddhiḥ naiḥsvābhāvyāt kuto hi te hetuḥ .
nirhetukasya siddhir na copapannāsya te 'rthasya .. 17 ..

niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā ity etasmin arthe te hetor asiddhiḥ . kiṃ kāraṇaṃ niḥsvabhāvatvād dhi sarvabhāvānāṃ śūnyatvān na tato hetuḥ . asati hetau nirhetukasyārthasya śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti kuta eva prasiddhiḥ .. tatra yad uktaṃ śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tan na ..

kiñcānyat .

If the denial of substance is established without a reason, the opponent equally does not need a reason to establish the existence of substance.

18
yadi cāhetoḥ siddhiḥ svabhāvavinivartanasya te bhavati .
svābhāvyasyāstitvaṃ mamāpi nirhetukaṃ siddhaṃ .. 18 ..

atha manyase nairhetukī siddhiḥ niḥsvabhāvatvasya bhāvānām iti . yathā tava svabhāvanirvartanaṃ nirhetukaṃ siddhaṃ . tathā mamāpi svabhāvasatbhāvo 'pi nirhetukaḥ siddhaḥ ..

If the reason substantiating the thesis of emptiness exists, it is a counterexample to it

19
atha hetor astitvaṃ bhāvānaiḥsvābhāvyam ity anupapannaṃ .
loko naiḥsvabhāvyān na hi kaścana vidyate bhāvaḥ .. 19 ..

iha yadi hetor astitvaṃ manyase . niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tad anupapannaṃ .. kiṃ kāraṇaṃ . na hi loke niḥsvabhāvaḥ kaścid bhāvo 'sti ..

kiñcānyat .

As the negation cannot be earlier or later than the object of negation, or be simultaneous with it, the negation of substance fails.

20
pūrvaṃ cet pratiṣedhaḥ paścāt pratiṣedhyam iti na copapannaṃ .
yaś cānupapanno yugapac ca yataḥ svabhāvo 'san .. 20 ..

iha pūrvaṃ cet pratiṣedhaḥ paścāc ca pratiṣedhyaṃ . niḥsvabhāvyaṃ nopapannaṃ . asati hi pratiṣedhye kasya pratiṣedhaḥ .. atha paścāt pratiṣedhaḥ pūrvaṃ pratiṣedhyam iti ca nopapannaṃ . siddhe hi pratiṣedhye kiṃ pratiṣedhaḥ karoti . atha yugapatpratiṣedhaḥ pratiṣedhye tathāpi na pratiṣedhaḥ pratiṣedhyasyārthasya kāraṇaṃ prati na pratiṣedhyaḥ . na pratiṣedhasya ca yathā yugapadutpannayor goviṣāṇayoḥ naiva dakṣiṇaṃ savyasya kāraṇaṃ savyaṃ vā dakṣiṇasya gāraṇaṃ bhavatīti . tatra yad uktaṃ niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tan na .

atrocyate . yat tāvad bhavatoktaṃ

sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ sarvatra na vidyate svabhāvaś cet .
tvadvacanam asvabhāvaṃ na nivartayituṃ svabhāvam alam [1] iti .

atra brūmaḥ .

The token statement 'all things are empty' is a specific sound-event produced in dependence on causes and conditions and therefore empty of substance; as such, it instantiates emptiness.

21
hetupratyayasāmagrāṃ pṛthagbhāve 'pi madvaco na yadi .
nanu śūnyatvaṃ siddhaṃ bhāvānām asvabhāvatvāt .. 21 ..

yadi madvaco hetau nāsti mahābhūteṣu saṃprayukteṣu viprayukteṣu vā pratyayeṣu nāsti . uraḥkaṇthojihvādantatālunāsikamūrdhaprabhṛtiṣu ya + + sāmagryām asti heṃpratyayasāmagrīṃ vinirmuktaṃ pṛthag vāsti . tasmān niḥsvabhāvā niḥsvabhāvatvāc chūnyaṃ . evaṃ . nanu śūnyatvaṃ siddhaṃ niḥsvabhāvatvād asya madīyavacasaḥ . yathā caitan madvacanaṃ niḥsvabhāvatvāc chūnyaṃ . tathā sarvabhāvā niḥsvabhāvatvāc chūnyā iti . yad bhavatoktaṃ tvadīyavacasaḥ śūnyatvāt śūnyatā sarvabhāvānāṃ nopapadyata iti tan na ..

kiñcānyat .

Being causally originated, speech is causally efficacious, like a pot or a chariot, and plays a part in establishing the lack of substance.

22
yaś ca pratītya bhāvānāṃ śūnyateti taṃ brū + + .
yas tu pratītyabhāvo bhavati hi tasyāsvabhāvatvaṃ .. 22 ..

śūnyatārthañ ca bhavān bhāvānām anavasamya śūnyatārtham ajñātvā pravṛtti upālambhaṃ vaktuṃ tvadvacanasya śūnyatvāt tvadvacanasya niḥsvabhāvatvād evaṃ tvadvacanena niḥsvabhāvena bhāvānāṃ svabhāvapratiṣedho nopapadyata iti . iha hi yaḥ pratītya bhavānāṃ bhāvaḥ sā śūnyatā . kasmān niḥsvabhāvatvāt . ye hi pratītyasamutpānnā bhāvās te sa sasvabhāvā bhavanti . svabhāvābhāvāt . tasmād dhetupratyayāpekṣatvāt . yadi hi svabhāvato bhāvā bhaveyuḥ . pratyākhyāyāpi hetupratyayāṃś ca bhaveyuḥ . na cevaṃ bhavanti . tasmān niḥsvabhāvāḥ niḥsvabhāvatvāc chūnyā ity abhidhīyante . evaṃ madīyam api vacanaṃ . pratītyasamutpannatvān niḥsvabhāvaṃ niḥsvabhāvatvāt śūnyam ity upapannaṃ .

yathā ca pratītyasamutpannatvāt svabhāvaśūnyāḥ . rathapaṭaghaṭādayaḥ sveṣu sveṣu kāryeṣu kāṣṭhāhaṇamṛttikaharaṇamadhūdakapayasāṃ dhāraṇā śītavātātapaparitrāṇaprabhṛtiṣu vartante . evam idaṃ madīyavacanaṃ pratyayasamutpannatvān niḥsvabhāvaṃ niḥsvabhāvatvaprasādhanaṃ pratyayabhāvānāṃ vartate . tatra yad uktaṃ . niḥsvabhāvatvāt tvadīyavacanasya śūnyatvaṃ śūnyatvāt tasya ca tena sarvabhāvasvabhāvapratiṣedha upapannam iti tan na ..

kiñcānyat .

The example of one illusory man hindering another illusory man serves to counteract the opponent's claim that all things without substance lack causal efficiency.

23
nirmitako nirmitakaṃ māyāpuruṣa svamāyayā sṛṣṭam .
pratiṣedhayati yadvat pratiṣedho yaṃ tathaiva syāt .. 23 ..

yathā nirmitakaḥ puruṣam abhyāpataṃ tu kaścid arthena vartamānaṃ pratiṣedhayet . māyākāreṇa vā sṛṣṭo māyāpurnṣo 'nyaṃ māyāpuruṣa samabhyava tan na kasminścid arthe vartamānaṃ pratiṣedhayet . tatra yo nirmitakaḥ puruṣaḥ pratiṣedhyate sa śūnyaḥ yaḥ pratiṣedhayati so 'pi māyāpuruṣaḥ śūnya evam eva madvacanena śūnyena sarvabhāvānāṃ svabhāvapratiṣedha upapannaḥ .. tatra yad bhavatoktaṃ . śūnyatvāt tvadvacanasya sarvabhāvasvabhāvapratiṣedho nopapannam iti tan na . ṣaṭkoṭiko vāda uktaḥ sa evaṃ pratisiddhaḥ naiva hy evaṃ sati na sarvabhāvāntargataṃ madvacanaṃ nāpy aśūnyaṃ nāpi sarvabhāvā 'śūnyāḥ .

yat punar bhavatoktam

atha sasvabhāvam etad vākyaṃ pūrvā hatā pratijñā te
vaiṣamikatvaṃ tasmin viśeṣahetuś ca vaktavya [2] ity

atrāpi brūmaḥ .

24
na svābhāvikam etad vākyaṃ tasmān na vādahānir me .
nāsti ca vaiṣamikatvaṃ viśeṣahetuś ca na nigadyaḥ .. 24 ..

na tāvad etan mama vacanaṃ pratītyasamutpannatvāt svabhāvopapannaṃ yathā pūrvam uktaṃ . svabhāvānupapannatvāt śūnyaṃ . yasmāc ca idam api madvacanaṃ śūnyaṃ śeṣāpi sarvabhāvāḥ śūnyās tasmān nāsti vaiṣamikatvaṃ . yadi hi vayaṃ brūmaḥ . idaṃ vacanam aśūnyaṃ śeṣāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ śūnyā iti tato vaiṣamikatvaṃ . syān na caitad evaṃ tasmān na vaiṣamikatvaṃ . yasmāc ca vaiṣamikatvaṃ na saṃbhavati idaṃ vacanam aśūnyaṃ śeṣāḥ punaḥ sarvabhāvāḥ śūnyā iti . tasmād asmābhir viśeṣahetur api na vaktavyaḥ anena idaṃ vacanaṃ aśūnyaṃ sarvabhāvāḥ punaḥ śūnyā iti . tatra yad bhavatoktaṃ vādahānis te vaiṣamikatvaṃ ca viśeṣahetuś ca tvayā vaktavya iti tan na .

yat punar bhavatoktaṃ .

mā śabdavad ity etad asmāt te buddhir na caitad upapannaṃ .
śabdena hy atra satā bhaviṣyato vāraṇaṃ tasyeti . [3]

atra brūmaḥ .

25
mā śabdavad iti nāyaṃ dṛṣṭānto yas tvayā mamārabdhaḥ .
śabdena hi tac ca śabdasya vāraṇaṃ naidam eva caḥ .. 25 ..

nāpy ayam asmākaṃ dṛṣṭāntaḥ . yathā kaścin mā śabdaṃ karṣīr iti bruvaṃ śabdam eva karoti śabdañ ca pratiṣedhayati . yadvat śūnyena vacanena śūnyatāṃ pratiṣedhayati . kiṃ kāraṇaṃ . atra hi dṛṣṭānte śabdena śabdasya vyāvartanaṃ kriyate . na caitad evaṃ vayaṃ brūmaḥ . niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ niḥsvabhāvatvāt tad aśūnyām iti .

kiṃ kāraṇaṃ

26
naiḥsvabhāvyānāṃ cen naiḥsvābhāvyena vāraṇaṃ yadi hi .
naiḥsvabhāvyanirvṛttau svabhāvyaṃ hi prasiddhaṃ syāt .. 26 ..

yathā mā śabdam iti śabdena śabdasya vyāvartanaṃ kriyate . evaṃ yadi naiḥsvabhāvyena vacanena naiḥsvabhāvyānāṃ vyāvartanaṃ kriyate tato 'yaṃ dṛṣṭāntopapannaḥ syāt . iha tu naiḥsvabhāvyena vacanena bhāvānāṃ svabhāvapratiṣedhaḥ kriyate . evaṃ yadi naiḥsvabhāvyena vacanena niḥsvabhāvānāṃ naiḥsvabhāvyapratiṣedhaḥ kriyate . naiḥsvabhāvyapratiṣedhād eva sasvabhāvā bhaveyuḥ . sasvabhāvatvād aśūnyāḥ syuḥ . śūnyatāñ ca vayaṃ bhāvānām ācakṣmahe nāśūnyatām ity adṛṣṭānta evāyam iti .

Being an illusion does not preclude causal efficacy

27
atha vā nirmitakāyāṃ yathā striyāṃ striyam ity asatgrāhaṃ .
nirmitakaḥ pratihanyāt kasyacid evaṃ bhaved ettata .. 27 ..

atha vā kasyacit puruṣasya nirmitakāyāṃ striyāṃ svabhāvaśūnyāyāṃ paramārthataḥ striyam ity asadgrāhaḥ . syād eva tasyāṃ tenāsadgrāheṇa rāgam utpādayet . tad yathā tathāgatena vā tacchrāvakeṇa vā nirmitako nirmitaḥ syāt . tathāgatādhiṣṭhānena vā tathāgatasrāvakādhiṣṭhānena vā tasya tam asadgrāhaṃ vinivartayet . evam eva nirmitakopamena śūnyena vacanena nirmitakastrīsadṛśyeṣu niḥsvabhāveṣu yo 'yaṃ svabhāvagrāhaḥ sa nivartyate sa pratiṣidhyate . tasmād ayam atra dṛṣṭāntaḥ śūnyatāprasādhanaṃ pratyupapadyamāno netaraḥ .

While the statements 'Do not make a sound' and 'All things are empty' are both empty and therefore analogous at the ultimate level, they are not analogous at the level of conventional truth, and it is at this level that all philosophical debates are conducted.

28
atha vā sādhyasamo yaṃ hetur na hi vidyate dhvaneḥ sattā .
saṃvyavahārañ ca vayaṃ nānabhyupagamya kathayāmaḥ .. 28 ..

mā śabdavad iti sādhyasama evāyaṃ hetuḥ . kasmāt sarvabhāvānāṃ naiḥsvabhāvyenāviśiṣṭatvāt . na hi tasya dhvaneḥ pratītyasamutpannatvāt . svabhavaṃ sattāḥ vidyate . tasyāḥ svabhāvasattāyā avidyamānatvāt .

yad uktaṃ

śabdena hy atra sattā bhaviṣyato vāraṇaṃ tasyeti .

tad vyāhanyate .

api ca na vayaṃ vyavahārasatyaṃ pratyākhyāya vyavahārasatyam anabhyupagamya kathayāmaḥ . śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti . na hi vyavahārasatyam anāgamya śakyā dharmadeśanā kartuṃ .

yathoktaṃ

vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate .
paramārtham anāgamya nirvāṇaṃ nādhigamyata iti . [= MMK 24.18]

tasmān madvacanavat śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvānāñ ca niḥsvabhāvatvam ubhayathopapadyamānam iti ..

yat punar bhavatoktaṃ .

pratiṣedhaḥ pratiṣedhyo 'py evam iti mataṃ bhavet tad asad eva .
evaṃ tava pratijñā lakṣaṇato dūṣyeta na mameti . [4]

atra brūmaḥ .

If some theses were supplied with a conventionalist semantics and others with a realist one, convention-based statements would be powerless to refute a substantial one; however, as all Madhyamaka statements are to be supplied with the same convention-based semantics, the charge of powerlessness does not apply.

29
yadi kācana pratijñā tatra syān na me tat eṣa me bhaved doṣaḥ .
nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmān naivāsti me doṣaḥ .. 29 ..

yadi ca kācin mama pratijñā syāt tato mama pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptatvāt sa pūrvako doṣaḥ . yathā tvayoktaṃ bhāvāḥ tathā mama syān na ca mama kācid asti pratijñā . tasmāt sarvahhāveṣu śūnyeṣv atyantopaśānteṣu prakṛtivivikteṣu kutaḥ pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptiḥ kutaḥ pratijñālakṣaṇatāprāptikṛto doṣaḥ . tatra yat bhavatoktaṃ pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptatvāt tavaiva doṣa iti tan nāsti .

yat punar bhavatoktaṃ

pratyakṣeṇa hi tāvad yady upalabhya nivartayasi bhāvān
tan nāsti pratyakṣaṃ bhāvā yenopalabhyaṃta . [5]

anumānaṃ pratyuktaṃ pratyakṣeṇāgamopamāne
cānumānāgamasādhyā ye 'rthā dṛṣṭāntasādhyāś ceti . [6]

atra vayaṃ brūmaḥ .

Epistemic instruments lack substantial existence, therefore no objects are affirmed or denied as substantially existent after having apprehended them by one of the epistemic instruments.

30
yadi kiñcid upalabheyaṃ pravarteyaṃ nivartayeyaṃ vā .
pratyakṣādibhir arthais tadabhāvān me 'nupālambhaḥ .. 30 ..

yady ahaṃ kiñcid artham upalabheyaṃ pratyakṣānumānopa + + + + hetubhiḥ pramāṇaiḥ . caturṇāṃ vā pramāṇānāṃ . anyatamānyatamena . ata evaṃ pravartayeyaṃ vā 'rtham evāhaṃ kiñcin nopalabhate tasmān na pravartayāmi na nivartayāmi . tatraivaṃ sati yau bhavatopālambhoktaḥ . yadi pratyakṣādīnāṃ pramāṇānām anyatamena upalabhya bhāvān vinivartayasīti . nanu bhavatoktāni pramāṇāni na santi taiś ca pramāṇair api gamyārthā iti sa me bhavaty evānupālambha iti .

The epistemic instruments must be established by what must be an epistemic instrument, too, since the epistemic instruments are part of the world, and the opponent claims that our epistemic access to the world is made possible by epistemic instruments.

31
yadi ca pramāṇatas teṣāṃ teṣāṃ prasiddhir arthānāṃ .
teṣāṃ punaḥ prasiddhiṃ brūhi kathaṃ teṣāṃ pramāṇānāṃ .. 31 ..

prasiddhir iti

yadi ca pramāṇatas teṣāṃ teṣām arthānāṃ prameyānāṃ siddhiṃ manyase yathā mānair meyānāṃ . tathā teṣām idānīṃ pratyakṣānumānopamānāgamānāṃ caturṇāṃ pramāṇānāṃ kutaḥ prasiddhiḥ . yadi tāvan niḥpramāṇānāṃ pramāṇaṃ syān nādeḥ siddhis tatrāsti naiva madhyasya nāntasya . yadi punaḥ manyase pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhiḥ pramāṇato 'rthānāṃ prasiddhir iti . hīyate pratijñā .

tathāpi

If the epistemic instruments were established by other epistemic instruments, there would be an infinite regress.

32
anyaiḥ yadi pramāṇaiḥ pramāṇasidhir bhavaty anavasthā syān .
nādeḥ siddhis tatrāsti naiva madhyasya nāntasya .. 32 ..

yadi punar manyase . pramāṇaiḥ prameyāṇāṃ prasiddhis teṣāṃ pramāṇānām anyaiḥ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhir anavasthāprasaṅgaḥ . anavasthāprasaṅge ko doṣaḥ .

nādeḥ siddhis tatrāsti naiva madhyasya nāntasya .

asyānavasthāprasaṅge ādeḥ siddhir nāsti . kiṃ kāraṇaṃ teṣam api hi pramāṇānām anyaiḥ pramāṇaiḥ siddhis teṣām anyair iti nāsty ādiḥ . āder asadbhāvāt kuto madhyaṃ kuto antaḥ . tasmāt teṣāṃ pramāṇānām anyaiḥ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhiḥ nopapadyateti .

If the epistemic instruments do not require other epistemic instruments to establish them, then the view that everything knowable is known through epistemic instruments is defeated.

33
teṣām atha pramāṇair vinā prasiddhiḥ vihīyate vādaḥ .
vaiṣamikatvaṃ tasmin viśeṣahetuś ca vaktavyaḥ .. 33 ..

atha manyase teṣāṃ pramāṇānāṃ vinā pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhiḥ prameyānāṃ punar arthānāṃ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhir iti . evaṃ sati yas te vādaḥ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhir arthānām iti hīyate vaiṣamikatvañ ca bhavati . keṣāñcit . arthānāṃ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhiḥ keṣāñcin neti viśeṣahetuś ca vaktavyaḥ . yena hetunā keṣāṃcid arthānāṃ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhiḥ keṣāñcin neti . sā ca nopadiṣṭaḥ tasmād iyam api kalpanā nopapanneti .

atrāha . pramāṇāny eva mama svātmānaṃ parātmānañ ca prasādhayanti . yathoktaṃ .

dyostayati svātmānaṃ yathā hutāsaḥ tathā parātmānaṃ .
svaparātmānāv eṣaṃ prasādhayanti pramāṇāni .

param iva svātmānaṃ parātmānañ ceti ..

atrocyate .

The analogy of a self-illuminating fire is mistaken; for x to illuminate y, y must first exist in the darkness, where it can be perceived by sensory faculties other than sight, but the fire does not exist in the darkness, its illuminating power and its existence come into being at the same time.

34
viṣamopanyāso 'yaṃ na hy ātmānaṃ prakāśayaty agniḥ .
na hi tasyānupalabdhiḥ dṛṣṭā tamasīva kumbhasya .. 34 ..

viṣama evāyam upanyāsaḥ . agnivat pramāṇāni svātmānañ ca prasādhayanti parātmānañ ca prasādhayantīti . na hy agnir ātmānaṃ prakāśayati . yadi hi yathā prāg evāgninā aprakāśitas tamasi kumbho nopalabhyate . athottarakālam upalabhyate 'gninā prakāśitaḥ san evam eva yady agninā na prakāśitaḥ prāg agniḥ syād uttarakālam agneḥ prakāśanaṃ syāt . ataḥ svātmānaṃ prakāśayen naitad evaṃ . tasmād iyam api kalpanā nopapadyanteti .

kiñcānyat .

If fire illuminates itself like others, it must also consume itself, because the consumption of firewood and the illumination are two descriptions of the same process, which, if reflexive, must be reflexive under any description.

35
yadi ca svātmānam ayaṃ tvadvacanena prakāśayaty agniḥ .
param iva na tv ātmānaṃ paridhakṣyaty api hutāśaḥ .. 35 ..

yadi ca tvadvacanena yathā parātmānaṃ prakāśayaty agniḥ evam eva svātmānam api prakāśayaty agnir iti . nanu yathā parātmānaṃ dahati . evam eva svātmānam api dhakṣyatīti . na caitad evaṃ . tatra yad uktaṃ parātmānam iva svātmānaṃ prakāśayaty agnir iti tan na ..

kiñcānyat .

If a relation R relates an object to itself, the opposite of R must also relate the opposite of the object to itself, so if fire illuminates both itself and others, darkness will conceal both itself and others, and we would not be able to perceive darkness.

36
yadi ca svaparātmānau tvadvacanena prakāśayaty agniḥ .
prachādayiṣyati tamaḥ svaparātmānau hutāśa iva .. 36 ..

yadi ca bhavato bhavato matena svātmāparātmānau prakāśayaty agniḥ . nanv idānīṃ pratipakṣabhūtatamo 'pi svaparātmānau chādayet . naitad iṣṭaṃ . tatra yad uktaṃ svaparātmānau prakāśayaty agnir iti tan na ..

kiñcānyat .

Illumination is the destruction of the dark, yet darkness is not present in the flame or in its immediate surroundings.

37
nāsti tamaś ca jvalane yatra ca tiṣṭhate parātmani jvalanaḥ .
kurute kathaṃ prakāśaṃ sa hi prakāśo andhakāravadhaḥ .. 37 ..

iha cāgnau nāsti tamaḥ . nāpi ca yatrāgnis tatrāsti tamaḥ . prakāśaś ca nāma tamasaḥ pratighātas tatra katham asya tamasaḥ . pratighatam agniḥ karoti . yasya pratighātat svaparātmānau prakāśayatīti ..

āha . yad yasmād evaṃ nāgnau tamo 'sti . nāpi yatrāgnis tatra tamo 'sti . yasmād evaṃ svaparātmānau na prakāśayaty agniḥ . tena hy utpadyamānenaivāgninā tamasaḥ pratighataḥ kutaḥ tasmān nāgnau tamo 'sti . nāpi yatrāgniḥ tatra tamo 'sti . yasmād utpadyamāna evobhayaṃ prakāśayaty agniḥ svātmānaṃ parātmānañ ceti .

atrocyate

If fire and darkness coexist in the moment of the fire's arising, it is unclear why the lack of causal connection between fire and darkness during the moment of origination is not perpetuated and how the fire ever manages to remove darkness.

38
utpadyamāna eva prakāśayaty agnir ity asadvādaḥ .
utpadyamāna eva prāpnoti tamo na hi hutāśaḥ .. 38 ..

ayam agnir utpadyamāna eva prakāśayati svātmānaṃ parātmānañ ceti . nāyam upapadyate vādaḥ . kasmān na hy utpadyamāna evāgniḥ tamaḥ prāpnoti . aprāptatvān naivopahanti . tamasaś cānupaghātān nāsti prakāśaḥ .

If no connection between fire and darkness is required for the former to remove the latter, the fire present here would remove all darkness whatsoever.

39
aprāpto 'pi jvalano yadi vā punar andhakāram upahanyāt .
sarveṣu lokadhātuṣu tamo 'yam iha saṃsthita upahanyāt .. 39 ..

athāpi manyase aprāpto 'py agnir andhakāram upahantīti . nanv idānīm iha saṃsthito 'gniḥ sarvalokadhātustham upahaniṣyati tamaḥ tulyāyām aprāpto na caitad evaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ . tasmād aprāpyaivāgnir andhakāram upahantīti yad iṣṭaṃ . tan na .

If the epistemic instruments establish their own veridicality, they do not need to be established by the epistemic objects.

40
yadi ca svataḥ pramāṇasiddhir anapekṣya te prameyāṇi .
bhavati pramāṇasiddhiḥ nāparāpekṣā hi siddhir iti .. 40 ..

yadi cāgnivat svataḥ pramāṇasiddhir iti manyase . anapekṣāpi prameyāṇi pramāṇānāṃ siddhiḥ bhaviṣyatīti kiṃ kāraṇaṃ . na hi svataḥ param apekṣate . athāpekṣyate na svataḥ prasiddhiḥ .

atrāha . yadi nāpekṣyante prameyān arthān apramāṇāni ko doṣo bhaviṣyatīti . atrocyate .

If the establishment of the epistemic instruments is independent of the objects to be known, their epistemic veracity cannot be established through successful interaction with the epistemic objects.

41
anāpekṣā hi prameyān arthān yadi te pramāṇasaṃsiddhiḥ .
bhavati na bhavanti kasyacid evam imāni pramāṇāni .. 41 ..

yadi prameyān arthān anapekṣya siddhir bhavati pramāṇānām iti . tānīmāni pramāṇāni na kasyacit pramāṇāni bhavanti . evaṃ doṣaḥ .. atha kasyacit bhavanti prāmāṇāni . naivedānīm anapekṣya prameyān arthān pramāṇāni bhavanti ..

Using knowledge of epistemic objects to establish the epistemic instruments is circular, because such knowledge can only come through the epistemic instruments, which therefore already have to be established.

42
atha matam apekṣa siddhis teṣām iti atra bhavati ko doṣaḥ .
siddhasya na sādhanaṃ syān nāsiddho pekṣate hy anyat .. 42 ..

athāpi matam apekṣya prameyān arthān pramāṇānāṃ siddhir bhavatīti . evaṃ te sati siddhasya pramāṇacatuṣṭayasya sādhanaṃ bhavatīti . kiṃ kāraṇaṃ . na hy asiddhasyārthasyāpekṣaṇaṃ bhavati . na hy asiddho devadattaḥ kañcid artham apekṣate na ca siddhasya sādhanam iṣṭaṃ kṛtasya kāraṇam anupapatter iti ..

kiñcānyat .

If the epistemic instuments are established dependent on the epistemic objects, then the epistemic objects cannot be established dependent on the epistemic instruments.

43
sidhyanti hi prameyāṇy apekṣya yadi sarvathā pramāṇāni .
bhavanti prameyasiddhir anapekṣyaiva pramāṇāni .. 43 ..

yadi prameyāṇy apekṣya pramāṇāni sidhyanti . nedānīṃ pramāṇāny apekṣya prameyāṇi sidhyanti . kiṃ kāraṇaṃ na hi sādhyaṃ sādhanaṃ sādhanaṃ sādhayati . sādhanāni ca . kila prameyāṇāṃ pramāṇāni ..

kiñcānyat .

If the establishment of the epistemic objects is independent of the epistemic instruments, then the epistemic instruments lose their role as a means of getting at the epistemic objects.

44
yadi ca prameyasiddhir anapekṣaiva bhavati pramāṇāni .
kin te pramāṇasiddhyā tāni yad arthaṃ prasiddhaṃ tata .. 44 ..

yadi ca manyase 'napekṣyaiva pramāṇāni prameyānāṃ prasiddhir bhavati . kim idānīṃ te pramāṇasiddhyā paryanviṣṭayā kiṃ kāraṇaṃ . yad arthaṃ hi tāni pramāṇāni paryanviṣyeran . te prameyārthā vinā pramāṇaiḥ siddhāḥ tatra kiṃ pramāṇaiḥ kṛtyaṃ .

If the epistemic instruments are established by the objects, it turns the instruments into epistemic objects while the epistemic objects, which fulfill the function of the establisher of the instruments, turn into instruments themselves.

45
atha tu pramāṇasiddhir bhavaty apekṣyaiva te prameyāṇi .
vyatyaya evaṃ sati te dhruvaṃ pramāṇaprameyāṇāṃ .. 45 ..

athāpi manyase 'pekṣyaiva prameyān arthāna pramāṇāni bhavanti . evaṃ te sati mā bhūt pūrvoktadoṣa iti kṛtvā . evaṃ te sati vyatyayaḥ + + + + + yāṇāṃ bhavati . pramāṇāni te prameyāṇi bhavanti . prameyaiḥ sādhitatvāt . pramāṇāni ca prameyāṇi bhavanti . pramāṇānāṃ sādhakatvāt .

If the establishment of the epistemic instruments is by the epistemic objects because of the dependence on them, and vice versa, it follows that neither the epistemic instruments nor the epistemic objects are established.

46
atha te pramāṇasiddhyā prameyasiddhiḥ prameyasiddhyā ca .
bhavati pramāṇasiddhiḥ nāsty ubhayasyāpi te siddhiḥ .. 46 ..

atha manyase pramāṇasiddhyā prameyasiddhir bhavati pramāṇāpekṣatvāt . prameyasiddhyā ca pramāṇasiddhir bhavati prameyāpekṣatvād iti .. evaṃ saty ubhayasyāpi siddhir na .y. + + + + ṇaṃ

If we use the epistemic instruments to ground our knowledge of objects, but then have to to ground the instruments in terms of these very objects, nothing is grounded in this circular procedure.

47
sidhyanti hi pramāṇair yadi prameyāṇi tāni tair evā .
sādhyāni ca prameyais tāni kathaṃ sādhayiṣyanti .. 47 ..

yadi hi pramāṇaiḥ pramayāṇi sidhyanti tāni pramāṇāni tair eva prameyaiḥ sādhayitavyāni . nanv asiddheṣu prameyeṣu kāraṇasyāsiddhatvād asiddhāni kathaṃ sādhayiṣyanti prameyāṇīti .

If we need to ground the epistemic instruments in terms of epistemic objects, and if the epistemic objects are to be established by precisely these epistemic instruments, we have to admit that the unestablished epistemic instruments cannot establish anything.

48
sidhyanti ca prameyaiḥ yadi pramāṇāni tāni tair eva .
sādhyāni ca prameyais tāni kathaṃ sādhayiṣyanti .. 48 ..

yadi prameyaiḥ pramāṇāni sidhyanti tāni ca prameyāṇi tair eva pramāṇaiḥ sādhayitavyānīti . nanv asiddheṣu pramāṇeṣu kāraṇasyāsiddhatvād asiddhāni kathaṃ sādhayiṣyanti pramāṇāni .

In order to apply the father-son analogy (in which the son is existentially dependent on the father, and the father is notionally dependent on the son to be described as the father) to the relationship between the epistemic instruments and the epistemic objects, it needs to be clarified which of the two is the 'father' and which is the 'son'.

49
pitra yady utpādyaḥ putro yadi tena caiva putreṇa .
utpādyaḥ sa yadi pitā vada tatrotpādayati kaḥ kaṃ .. 49 ..

tadyathāpi nāma kaścit brūyāt . pitrā putra utpādanīyaḥ sa ca pitā putreṇotpādanīya iti . tatredānīṃ brūhi kena ka utpādayitavyaḥ . tathaiva khalu bhavāna bravīti . pramāṇaiḥ prameyāni sādhayitavyāni tāny eva ca punaḥ pramāṇāni taiḥ prameyaiḥ tatredānīṃ tu katamaiḥ katamāni sādhayitavyāni .

Even if we consider the case in terms of the difference between existential dependence (such as the dependence of the son upon the father) and notional dependence (such as that of the father upon the son in order to be classified as a father), the problem remains that if the epistemic instruments and the epistemic objects are mutually dependent, it cannot be the case that one is intrisically an establisher and one intrinsically something to be established.

50
kaś ca pitā kaḥ putraḥ tatra tvaṃ brūhi kathaṃ tāv ubhāv api ca .
pitreputralakṣaṇadharau yato nas tatra saṃdehaḥ .. 50 ..

tayoś ca pūrvopadiṣṭayoḥ pitāputrayoḥ vada kataraḥ putraḥ kataraḥ pitā ubhāv api tāv utpādakatvāt pitṛlakṣaṇadharau . utpādyatvāc ca putralakṣaṇadharāv atra naḥ sandeho bhavati . kataras tatra pitā kataras tatra putra iti . evam eva yāny etāni bhavati . pramāṇaprameyāṇi . tatra katarāṇi pramāṇāni katarāṇi prameyāṇi . ubhayāny api hy etāni pramāṇāni tāni prameyāṇi sādhyatvāt prameyāṇīti . atra naḥ sandeho bhavati . katarāṇy atra pramāṇāni katarāṇi prameyāṇīti .

The epistemic instruments are not self-established, nor are they mutually established or established by other epistemic instruments, nor are they established by the epistemic objects or established without reason.

51
naiva svataḥ prasiddhir na parasparataḥ pramāṇair vā .
bhavati na ca prameyaiḥ na cāpy akasmāt pramāṇānāṃ .. 51 ..

na svataḥ prasiddhiḥ pratyakṣasya tenaiva pratyakṣeṇānumānasya tenaivānumāne . upamānasya tenaivopamānena . āgamasya tenaivāgamena .. nāpi parasyāt pratyakṣasyānumānopamānāgamair anumānasya pratyakṣopamānāgamair upamānasya pratyakṣānumānāgamaiḥ . āgamasya pratyakṣānumānopamānaiḥ . nāpi pratyakṣānumānopamānāgamād anyaiḥ pratyakṣānumānopamānāgamair yathāsvaṃ nāpi prameyaiḥ samastavyastaiḥ svaviṣayaparaviṣatāgṛhītaiḥ nāpy akasmān nāsti samuccayena . eteṣāṃ kāraṇānāṃ pūrvoddiṣṭānāṃ viṃśas triṃśac catvāriśat ṣaṭviṃśatir vā tatra yad uktaṃ . pramāṇādhigamyatvāt prameyāṇāṃ bhāvānāṃ santi tu prameyā bhāvās tāni ca pramāṇāni yais tu pramāṇaiḥ prameyā bhāvāḥ santaś ca bhāvāḥ samādhigatā iti tan na ..

yat punar bhavatoktam .

kuśalānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ dharmāvasthāvidaś ca manyante .
kuśalaṃ janasvabhāvaṃ manyante śeṣeṣv apy eṣa viniyogaḥ . [7]

atra brūmaḥ .

52
kuśalānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ dharmāvasthavido brūvate yat .
kuśalasvabhāvam evaṃ pravibhāgenābhidheyaḥ syāt .. 52 ..

kuśalānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ dharmāvasthavidaḥ kuśalaṃ janasvabhāvaṃ manyante . sa ca bhavatā pravibhāgenopadeṣṭavyaḥ . syād ayaṃ sa kuśalaḥ svabhāvaḥ ime te kuśalā dharmā iti . idaṃ tatkuśalavijñānam ayaṃ kuśalavijñānasvabhāva evaṃ sarveṣāṃ na caitad evaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ . tasmād yad uktam upadiṣṭaḥ svabhāvo dharmāṇām iti tan na ..

kiñcānyat .

The fact that the auspicious mental states are causally produced coupled with the mind-dependent notion of causation threatens the objectivity of the central concepts of the Buddhist path.

53
yadi ca pratītya kuśalaḥ svabhāva utpadyate sa kuśalānāṃ .
dharmāṇāṃ parabhāvaḥ svabhāva eva kathaṃ bhavati .. 53 ..

yadi ca kuśalānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ svabhāvo hetupratyayasāmagrīṃ pratītyotpadyate . parabhāvād utpannaḥ kuśalānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ kathaṃ svabhāvo bhavati . evam evākuśalaprabhṛtīnāṃ . tatra yad uktaṃ . kuśalāvyākṛtānāṃ nā .y. + + + dharmāṇāṃ kuśalaḥ svabhāvopadiṣṭaḥ . evam akuśalānām akuśalādir iti . tan na ..

kiñcānyat .

The denial of dependent origination entails the denial of the four noble truths: if the origin of suffering is denied, suffering is denied, and then there is no cessation of suffering which is but its destruction, and hence no ground for the path towards the cessation of suffering.

54
atha na pratītya kiñcit svabhāva utpadyate sa kuśalānāṃ .
dharmāṇām evaṃ syād vāso na brahmacaryasya .. 54 ..

atha manyase . na kiñcit pratītya kuśalānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ kuśalasvabhāva utpadyate . evam akuśalānāṃ dharmāṇām akuśalaḥ avyākṛtānām avyākṛta iti . evaṃ saty abrahmacaryavāso bhavati kiṃ kāraṇaṃ . pratītyasamutpādasya hi evaṃ sati pratyākhyānaṃ bhavati . pratītyasamutpādasya pratyākhyānāt pratītyasamutpādadarśaṇaṃ pratyākhyānaṃ bhavati . na hy avidyamānasya pratītyasamutpādasya darśanam utpadyamānaṃ bhavati . asati pratītyasamutpādadarśane dharmadarśanaṃ na bhavati . uktaṃ hi . bhagavatā yo hi bhikṣavaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ paśyati sa dharmaṃ paśyati . dharmadarśanābhāvād brahmacaryavāsābhāvaḥ ..

athavā pratītyasamutpādapratyākhyānāt . duḥkhasamudāyapratyākhyānaṃ bhavati . pratītyasamutpādo hi duḥkhasya samudayaḥ . duḥkhasamudayasya pratyākhyānād duḥkhapratyākhyānaṃ bhavati . asati hi samudaye tat kuto duḥkhaṃ samudeṣyati . duḥkhasamudayapratyākhyānāc ca duḥkhanirodhasya pratyākhyānaṃ . asati hi duḥkhasamudaye kasya prahāṇān nirodho bhaviṣyati . asati hi duḥkhanirodhe kasya prāptaye mārgo bhaviṣyati . duḥkhanirodhagāmī . evaṃ caturṇām āryasatyānām abhāvāc chrāmaṇyaphalābhāvaḥ . satyadarśanādiśramaṇyaphalāni samādhigamyante . śrāmaṇyaphalānām abhāvād abrahmacaryavāsa iti ..

kiñcānyat .

If the auspicious and inauspicious mental states are not part of the causal network, then (1) worldly conventions, such as the conventions of propriety, would not exist, as actions are right or wrong depending on whether they bring about auspicious or inauspicious mental states, (2) as acausal states are permanent, nothing can bring them about and nothing can cause them to cease, so the Buddhist path would be pointless, and (3) the postulation of permanent mental qualities contradicts the Buddha's teaching that all compounded phenomena are impermanent.

55
nādharmo dharmo vā satyavyavahārāś ca lokikā ni syuḥ .
nityāś ca sarvabhāvāḥ syuḥ nityatvād ahetumataḥ .. 55 ..

evaṃ sati pratītyasamutpādaṃ pratyācakṣaṇasya bhavataḥ ko doṣa prasajyate . dharmo na bhavati adharmo na bhavati . saṃvyavahārāś ca laukikā na sambhavanti . kiṃ kāraṇaṃ pratītyasamutpannaṃ hy etat sarvam asati pratītyasamutpāde kuto bhaviṣyati . api ca sasvabhāvo 'pratītyasamutpanno nirhetuko nityaḥ syāt . kiṃ kāraṇaṃ nirhetukā hi bhāvā nityās tatra sa eva cābrahmacaryavāsaḥ prasajyet svasiddhāntavirodhaś ca . kiṃ kāraṇam anityā hi bhagavatā sarve saṃskārā nirdeṣṭās te svabhāvanityatvān nityā hi bhavanti .

The auspicious, the inauspicious, the indeterminate mental states, those leading to liberation and others discussed in the Buddhist teachings would then have to be grouped together with such uncompounded phenomena as space.

56
eṣa cākuśaleṣv avyākṛteṣu nairyāṇādiṣu ca doṣas .
tasmāt sarvaṃ saṃskṛtam asaṃskṛtaṃ te bhavaty evaṃ .. 56 ..

yaś caiṣa kuśaleṣu nirdeṣṭaḥ kalpaḥ sa evākuśaleṣu sa evāvyākṛteṣu sa evānairyāṇikaprabhṛtiṣu doṣas tasmāt sarvam idaṃ saṃskṛtam asaṃskṛtaṃ saṃpadyate .. kiṃ kāraṇaṃ heto hy asaty utpādasthitibhaṅgā na bhavanti . utpādasthitibhaṅgeṣv asatsu saṃskṛtalakṣaṇābhāvāt . sarvaṃ saṃskṛtam asaṃskṛtaṃ saṃpadyate . tatra yad uktaṃ kuśalādīnāṃ bhāvānāṃ svabhāvasadbhāvād aśūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tan na ..

yat punar bhavatoktaṃ .

yadi ca na bhavet svabhāvo bhāvānāṃ na svabhāva ity evaṃ
nāmāpi bhaved evaṃ nāma hi nirvastukaṃ nāsti . [9]

Nāgārjuna rejects the realist semantic theory and is therefore not bound by the assumption that simple terms must have a referent, or indeed that names refer at all.

57
yaḥ sadbhūtaṃ nāma brūyāt sasvabhāva ity evam .
bhavatā prativaktavyo nāma brūmaś ca na vayaṃ sata .. 57 ..

yo nāma sadbhūtaṃ brūyāt sasvabhāva iti sa bhavatā prativaktavyaḥ syāt . yasya sadbhūtaṃ nāma svabhāvasya . tasmāt tenāpi svabhāvena sadbhūtena bhavitavyaṃ . na hy asadbhūtasya svabhāvasya sadbhūtaṃ nāma bhavatīti . na punar vayaṃ nāma sadbhūtaṃ brūmas tad api hi svabhāvasyābhāvān nāma niḥsvabhāvatvāt śūnyaṃ śūnyatvād asadbhūtam . tatra yad bhavatoktaṃ nāmasadbhāvāt sadbhūtaḥ svabhāvā iti . tan na ..

kiñcānyat .

Nāgārjuna challenges the proponent of a realist semantics, which requires simple terms in the language to have a referent, to identify a referent for the term 'non-existent'.

58
nāmāsad iti ca yad idaṃ tat kiṃ nu sato bhavaty utāsataḥ .
yadi hi sato yady asato dvidhāpi te hīyate vādaḥ .. 58 ..

yac caitan nāmāsad iti tat kiṃ sataḥ asataḥ . yadi hi satas tan nāma yady asata ubhayathāpi pratijñā hīyate . tatra yadi tāvat sata . asad iti pratijñā hīyate . na hīdanīṃ tad asad idānīṃ sad athāsata . asad iti nāma yā pratijñā asadbhūtasya nāma na bhavati astitvasvabhāva iti nāma tasmāt sadbhūtaḥ svabhāva iti . sā hīnā ..

kiñcānyat .

As Nāgārjuna asserts the thesis of universal emptiness, the constituents of language are subsumed under this as well.

59
sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ śūnyatvañ copapāditaṃ pūrvaṃ .
sa upālambhaḥ tasmād bhavaty ayañ cāpratijñāyāḥ .. 59 ..

iha cāsmābhiḥ pūrvam eva sarveṣāṃ bhāvānaṃ vistarataḥ śūnyatvam upapāditam . tatra prāg nāmano 'pi śūnyatvam uktaṃ saṃbhavā aśūnyatvaṃ parigṛhya pravṛtto vaktuṃ . yadi bhāvānāṃ svābhāvo na syād asvabhāva iti nāmāpīdan na syād iti . tasmād apratijñopālambho yaṃ bhavataḥ saṃpadyate . na hi vayaṃ nāma sadbhūtam iti brūmaḥ ..

yat punar bhavatoktaṃ .

atha vidyate svabhāvas sa ca dharmāṇāṃ na vidyate sa tasmāt
dharmair vinā svabhāvaḥ sa yasya tad yuktam upadeṣṭuṃ . [10]

60
atha vidyate svabhāvaḥ sa ca dharmāṇāṃ na vidyatat iti idam .
āśaṅkitaṃ yad uktaṃ bhavaty anāśaṅkitaṃ tac ca .. 60 ..

na hi vayaṃ dharmāṇāṃ svabhāvaṃ pratiṣedhayāmaḥ . dharmavinirmuktasya vā kasyacid arthasya svabhāvam abhyupagacchāmaḥ . nanv evaṃ sati ya upālambho bhavati . yadi dharmā niḥsvabhāvāḥ kasya khalv idānīm anyasyārthasya dharmavinirmuktasya svabhāvo bhavati . sa yuktam evopadeṣṭam iti . dūrāpakṛṣṭam evaitat bhavati .

yat punar bhavatoktaṃ .

sata eva pratiṣedho nāsti ghaṭo geha ity ayaṃ yasmāt .
dṛṣṭaḥ pratiṣedho 'yaṃ mataḥ svabhāvasya te tasmāt . [11] ity

atra brūmaḥ .

Realist semantics undermines the realist stance: even a sentence negating the insubstantiality of things, such as 'universal emptiness does not exist', must establish it, as realist semantics requires that all terms have a counterpart in the real world.

61
sata eva pratiṣedho yadi śūnyatvaṃ nanv apratisiddham idaṃ .
pratiṣedhayate hi bhavāna bhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhāvatvaṃ .. 61 ..

yadi svata eva pratiṣedho bhavati . nāmato bhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhāvatvaṃ pratiṣedhayati . nanu pratisidhaṃ sarvabhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhāvatvaṃ tvadvacanena . pratiṣedhayasi tvaṃ sadbhāvāt . niḥsvabhāvatvasya ca sarvabhāvānāṃ pratisidhatvāt . pratisiddhā śūnyateti

If we take the statement 'universal emptiness does not exist' to be true, then it cannot be meaningful, as one of its terms is now lacking a referent.

62
pratiṣedhayase atha tvaṃ śūnyatvaṃ tac ca nāsti śūnyatvam .
pratiṣedhaḥ sata iti te nanv eṣa vihīyate vādaḥ .. 62 ..

atha śūnyatvaṃ pratiṣedhayasi tvaṃ . sarvabhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhāvatvaṃ śūnyatvaṃ nāsti tac ca śūnyatvam . yā tarhi te pratijñā sataḥ pratiṣedho bhavati nāsata iti sā hīnā ..

kiñcānyat .

As there is no substance out there which could serve as a referent of the term 'substance', Nāgārjuna does not negate anything according to the realist semantics conceptualisation of negation.

63
pratiṣedhayāmi nāhaṃ kiñcit pratiṣedhyam asti na ca kiñcit .
tasmāt pratiṣedhayasīty adhilaya eva tvayā kriyate .. 63 ..

evam api tu kṛtvā yady ahaṃ kiñcit pratiṣedhayāmi tato yuktam eva vaktuṃ syāt . na caivahaṃ kiñcit pratiṣedhayāmi tasmān na kiñcit pratiṣedhavyam asti . tasmāt śūnyeṣu sarvabhāveṣv avidyamāne pratiṣedhye pratiṣedhayasīty eṣa tvayātra sadbhūto 'dhilayaḥ kriyata iti ..

yat punar bhavatoktaṃ .

atha nāsti sa svabhāvaḥ kin nu pratiṣidhyate tvayānena
vacanena rte vacanāt pratiṣedhaḥ sidhyate hy asataḥ .. [12]

atra brūmaḥ .

The point of Nāgārjuna's negation of substance is not destruction of an existent substance, but destruction of the mistaken superimposition of substance onto things and relieving ignorant people of this illusion.

64
yac cāhaṃ te vacanād asataḥ pratiṣedhavacanasiddhir iti .
atra jñāpayate vāg asad iti tan na pratinihanti .. 64 ..

ya ca bhavān bravīti . sate 'pi vacanād asataḥ pratiṣedhaḥ pratisiddhaḥ tatra kin niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ iti . etad vacanaṃ karotīti .. atra brūmaḥ niḥsvabhāvā iti etat khalu vacanaṃ na niḥsvabhāvāna sarvabhāvāna karoti . kintv asata svabhāva bhāvānām asata svabhāvānām iti jñāpayati . tatra kaścit brūyād avidyamānagṛhe devadattas tam asti gṛhe devadatta iti . tatrainaṃ kaścit pratibrūyān nāstīti . na tad. + + + + + devadattasyāsaṃbhavāṃ karoti . kintu jñāpayati kevalam asadbhāvaṃ gṛhe devadattasyeti .. tadvā nāsti svabhāvo bhāvānām ity etadvacanaṃ na svabhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhāvatvaṃ karoti . bhāveṣu svabhāvasyābhāvaṃ jñāpayati .. tatra yad bhavatoktaṃ kim asati svabhāve nāsti svabhāva ity etadvacanaṃ karoti . ṛte 'pi vacanāt prasiddhiḥ svabhāvasyābhāva iti . tat te na yuktaṃ

yad uktaṃ

bālānām iva mṛgatṛṣṇāyāṃ sa yathājalagrāhaḥ .
evaṃ mithyāgrāhaḥ syāt te prasidhyate hy asataḥ . [13]

yat punar bhavato mṛgātṛṣṇāyām ity atra brūmaḥ .

The illusory water perceived in a mirage is a useful example of an empty object.

65
mṛgatṛṣṇādṛṣṭānte yaḥ punar uktaṃ tvayā mahāṃś carcaḥ .
tatrāpi nirṇayaṃ śṛṇu yathā sa dṛṣṭānta upapannaḥ .. 65 ..

ya eva tvayā mṛgatṛṣṇādṛṣṭānte mahāṃś carca uktaḥ . tatrāpi tayā nirṇayaḥ sa śrūyatāṃ upapanna eva dṛṣṭānto bhavati .

The perception of water in the mirage does not exist substantially, as it is produced dependent on the mirage, dependent on the mistaken vision, and dependent on the irregular mental activity.

66
sa yadi svabhāvataḥ syād bhāvo na syāt pratītya samudbhūtaḥ .
yaś ca pratītya bhavati grāho nanu śūnyatā saiva .. 66 ..

yadi ca mṛgatṛṣṇāyāṃ sa yathājalagrāhaḥ svabhāvataḥ syāt . na syāt pratītyasamutpanno . yatho mṛgatṛṣṇāñ ca pratītya viparītañ ca darśanaṃ pratītya yoniśomanaskārañ ca pratītya prādurbhūto 'taḥ pratītyasamutpannaḥ yataś ca pratītyasamutpanno 'taḥ svabhāvataḥ śūnya eva . yathā pūrvam uktaṃ tathā

kiñcānyat .

If there was perception-independent water in the mirage, it could not be removed with actions that affect only sensory capacities.

67
yadi ca svabhāvataḥ syād grāhaḥ kas taṃ vinivartayed grāhaṃ .
śeṣeṣv apy eṣa vidhiḥ tasmād eṣo 'nupālambhaḥ .. 67 ..

yadi ca mṛgatṛṣṇāyāṃ jalagrāhaḥ svabhāvataḥ syāt . ka eva taṃ vinivartayetā . na hi svabhāvaḥ śakyo nivartayituṃ . tathāgner uṣṇatvam apāṃ dravatvam ākāśasya niravavaraṇatvaṃ . dṛṣṭaṃ cāsya vinivartanaṃ . tasmāc chūnyasvabhāvaḥ grāhaḥ . yadā caitad evaṃ śeṣeṣv api dharmeṣv eṣa kramaḥ pratyavagantavyaḥ grāhyapravṛttiṣu pañcasu . tatra yad bhavato + + + + pād aśūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tan na ..

yat punar bhavatoktaṃ |

hetoś ca te na siddhir naiḥsvabhāvyāt kuto hi te hetuḥ
nirhetukasya siddhir na copapannāsya te 'rthasya [l7] iti ..

atra brūmaḥ .

Both the negation of water in the mirage and the thesis of universal emptiness are empty, but causally efficacious in removing a mistaken belief.

68
etena hetvabhāvaḥ pratyuktaḥ pūrvam eva sa samatvāt .
mṛgatṛṣṇādṛṣṭāntavyāvṛttividhau ya uktaḥ prāg .. 68 ..

etenaiva cedānīṃ carcena pūrvoktena hetvabhāvo 'pi pratyavagantavyaḥ . ya eva hi carcaḥ pūrvasmin hetāv uktaḥ ṣaṭkapratiṣe + + + + + + hāpi carcayitavyaḥ .

yat punar bhavatoktaṃ .

pūrvaṃ cet pratiṣedhaḥ paścāt pratiṣedhyam ily anupapannaṃ .
paścāc cānupapanno yugapac ca yataḥ svabhāvo 'sana .. [20]

atra brūmaḥ .

The criticism of the temporal relation between a negation and the object it negates, which is endorsed by Nāgārjuna as an instance of the criticism of the temporal relation between cause and effect, does not defeat his negation of substance, as the object of negation here is not something apprehended by a correct perception, but is like the illusory water in the mirage.

69
yat traikālye hetuḥ pratyuktaṃ pūrvam eva sa samatvāt .
traikālyapratihetuś ca śūnyabhāvādinā prāptaḥ .. 69 ..

sa eṣa hetuḥ traikālye pratiṣedhavācī sa tūktottaraḥ pratyavamantaḥ . kasmāt sādhyasamatvāt . yathā hi pratiṣedhas traikālye nopapadye + + + + + + pratiṣedhapratiṣedhe 'pi . tasmāt pratiṣedhapratiṣedhye 'sati bhavāna manyate pratiṣedhaḥ pratisiddha iti tan na . yataś caiṣa trikālapratiṣedhavācī hetur eṣa eva śūnyatāvādināṃ prāptaḥ sarvabhāvasvabhāvapratiṣedhakatvān na bhavataḥ .

atha vā katham etad uktottaraṃ .

pratiṣedhayāmi nāhaṃ kiñcit pratiṣedhyam asti na ca kiñcit
tasmāt pratiṣedhayasīty adhilaya eṣa tvayā kriyata [63] iti ..

atha manyase triṣv api kāleṣu + + + + + + + dṛṣṭaḥ pūrvakālīno 'pi hetuḥ uttarakālīno 'pi . yugapatkālīno 'pi hetuḥ . kathaṃ pūrvakālīnaḥ . yathā pitā putrasya tvadvacanena paścātkālīnaḥ . yathā śiṣyācāryasya yugapatkālīnaḥ yathā pradīpaḥ prakāśasyeti .. atra brūmaḥ . na caitad eva yuktā hy etasmiṃ traye pūrvadoṣāḥ .. api ca punaḥ yady evaṃ kamaḥ . pratiṣedhasadbhāvas tvayābhyupagamyate . pratijñāhāniś ca te bhavati . e + + + + + + + svabhā + + + edho 'pi si + + bhavatīti .

Emptiness understood in terms of dependent origination supports the crucial elements of the Buddhist path, which works only on the basis that suffering, its origin, its cessation and the path leading to this cessation are dependently originated.

70
prabhavati ca śūnyateyaṃ yasya prabhavanti tasya sarvārthāḥ .
prabhavati na tasya kinna prabhavati śūnyatā yasyeti .. 70 ..

yasya śūnyateyaṃ prabhavati tasya sarvārthā laukikalokottarāḥ prabhavanti . kiṃ kāraṇaṃ . yasya hi śūnyatā prabhavati tasya pratītyasamutpādaḥ prabhavati . yasya pratītyasamutpādaḥ prabhavati tasya catvāry āryasatyāni prabhavanti . yasya catvāry āryasatyāni + + + + + + + maṇyaphalāni bhavanti . sarvaviśeṣādhigamāḥ bhavanti . yasya sarvaviśeṣādhigamāḥ prabhavanti . tasya trīṇi ratnāṇi buddhadharmasaṃghāḥ prabhavanti . yasya pratītyasamutpādaḥ prabhavanti tasya dharmo dharmahetur dharmaphalañ ca prabhavanti . tasyādharmo 'dharmahetuś cādharmaphalañ ca prabhavati . tasya kleśaḥ kleśasamudayaḥ kleśavastūni ca prabhavanti . yasyaitat sarvaṃ bhavati pūrvoktaṃ tasya sugatiṃ durgatiṃ vyavasthā + + + + + + + gatidurgatigamanaṃ . sugatidurgatigāmī mārgaḥ . sugatidurgatigamanavyatikramaṇaṃ sugatidurgativyatikramopāyaḥ sarvasaṃvyavahārāś ca lokikāḥ svayam adhigantavyāḥ . anayā diśā kiñcit śakyaṃ vacanopadeṣṭam iti .

bhavati cātra

yaḥ śūnyatāṃ pratītyasamutpādaṃ madhyamāṃ pratipadam
anekārthāṃ nijagāda praṇamāmi tam apratimaṃ tu buddhim iti ..

kṛtir iyam ācāryanāgārjunapādānā + + + + + ekatra ślokaśata 450 ..

.. likhitam idaṃ śrīdhramakirtinā sarvasatvahetoḥ yathālabdham iti ..

.. vigrahavyāvartiṇī ..